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Thaddeus Metz is an influential Research Professor 
of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg, 
the author of many incisive philosophical texts, 
and an authority on issues of transitional justice 
and reconciliation. His book on Meaning in Life 
is a natural continuation of his applied work in 
philosophy in the analytic tradition, and the way 
in which he captures philosophical theories of 
meaning in life is both original and practically 
exceptionally helpful to an array of applied fields 
in the humanities, including philosophical prac-
tice and philosophical counseling.
Metz’s central question in the book is whether 
life as a whole can be said to be meaningful as op-
posed to more or less ‘meaningless’, or whether it 
is specific parts of its, experiences, attitudes, events 
and relationships which are meaningful and, by 
extension, make one’s whole life meaningful. He 
examines various philosophical theories which 
he divides into ‘part life’ and ‘whole life theories’, 
critically and, in a number of places in his argu-
ment, touches key general philosophical questions 
such as that of coherence versus substantive qual-
ity of our beliefs as criteria which bestow quali-
ty on those beliefs, whether it is truthfulness or 
meaningfulness. For example, Pedro Tabensky’s 
‘coherence view’ of the meaning of life suggests 
that it is the way in which our particular attitudes, 
values and beliefs are unified in a single subject-
hood which allows us to say that, whatever we 
do, believe or experience, in an important sense, 
‘we are one’. This view is similar to a coherence 
theory of truth, which implies that a proposition 
is true if it convincingly fits with the other ac-
cepted truths in a single worldview or a view on 
a particular matter of fact. Metz rightly points it 
out that coherence in one’s beliefs and attitudes 
is an important element of one’s overall rational-
ity, and the more rational one is the more likely 
one is to find ways to make one’s life meaning-
ful, however Metz notes that the coherence view 
omits a crucial element of meaning which arises 
from the substantive value of specific beliefs and 
propositions one holds or adopts. At least theo-
retically, it is possible to hold an array of mutually 
highly coherent, yet dysfunctional, depressing or 
destructive views, just as it is theoretically pos-
sible to hold positive, energizing and optimistic 
beliefs which, while insufficiently systematically 
organized, make one’s life relatively meaningful. 
Metz thus suggests a kind of balance between the 
various extreme positions on the matter, suggest-
ing that all the various elements of the proposed 
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sources of ‘meaning in life’ have relative value to 
our overall quality of life and thus should be fac-
tored in a sound philosophical conceptualization 
of ‘the good life’:
It is fair to think that the content of ends is a 
different dimension by which they admit of 
rational appraisal, one logically distinct from 
the way in which ends are organized in relation 
to one another. For instance, I have suggested 
that at least some ends are meaningful and give 
us good reason to pursue, merely insofar as 
they involve the exercise of intelligence with 
regard to the good, the true, and the beauti-
ful. It would follow, then, that insofar as a life 
is rational, it, at least to some degree,  realizes 
ends with a certain content, independent of 
how these ends bear on the realization of  other 
ends. (Metz 2013: 57)
Metz’s own theory of meaning of life is what 
he calls ‘the fundamentality theory of meaning’, 
namely the view that what confers meaning on 
our lives is our search for meaning: the more crit-
ically and with greater focus we search for mean-
ing, our life becomes more sharpened through the 
values which become crystallized in the process: 
it becomes clear what is the most important to us 
through the sacrifices we are willing to make to 
realize those values: the family, justice, beauty, etc. 
Our search for meaning extends beyond the realm 
of immediate satisfaction and typically includes 
a desire to ‘leave a mark’ after we are no longer 
alive. Metz points it out that some of the greatest 
human achievements in history have been moti-
vated by thus conceptualized search for meaning, 
but also some of the most abhorrent projects in 
history, such as the racist, supremacist or geno-
cidal projects we are only too aware of. Most of 
these projects were motivated by a projection of 
an idea: one people, one leader, equality and jus-
tice (as in Marxist revolutions), etc. It seems that 
what drives our search for meaning is a zeal for 
the transcendence of our immediate existence.
A consequence of Metz’s fundamentality theory 
is that philosophy has a highly practical role in 
helping us shape and manage our search for tran-
scendence: by employing philosophical concepts 
and tools, one’ s search for meaning may become 
a better life, a happier one, and one which more 
successfully develops one’s sensibilities and val-
ues, as well as one’s ability to appraise one’s own 
life. All of this together, according to the funda-
mentality theory, makes life more meaningful.
Metz’s theory is unpretentious and exceptionally 
well argued based on existing philosophical the-
ories of meaning in life; it is a simple theory with 
wide-ranging ramifications for the future devel-
opment of philosophy as a practical discipline able 
to bring its enormous theoretical legacy to bear on 
helping concrete individuals achieve higher qual-
ity of life by developing more meaningful lives.
